Not All Anger Is Created Equal: The Impact of the Expresser’s Culture on the Social Effects of Anger in Negotiations

Hajo Adam  
Rice University

Aiwa Shirako  
New York University

The influence of culture on the social effects of emotions in negotiations has recently gained the attention of researchers, but to date this research has focused exclusively on the cultural background of the perceiver of the emotion expression. The current research offers the first investigation of how the cultural background of the expresser influences negotiation outcomes. On the basis of the stereotype that East Asians are emotionally inexpressive and European Americans are emotionally expressive, we predicted that anger will have a stronger signaling value when East Asians rather than European American negotiators express it. Specifically, we predicted that angry East Asian negotiators will be perceived as tougher and more threatening and therefore elicit great cooperation from counterparts compared with angry European American negotiators. Results from 4 negotiation studies supported our predictions. First, because of their mixed-motive nature, negotiations frequently invoke intense emotions (Cropanzano, Becker, & Feldman, 2012). Emotions convey important information about the thoughts, feelings, and intentions of negotiators and thus elicit behavioral responses from their counterparts (Barry, Fulmer, & Van Kleef, 2004; Morris & Kelmer, 2000). These social effects of emotions in negotiations have thus received increasing research attention (e.g., Filipowicz, Barsade, & Melwani, 2011; Kopelman, Rosette, & Thompson, 2006; Rothman, 2011; Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004a, 2006). Second, because of globalization, negotiations also frequently involve parties of different cultural backgrounds (Tinsley, Turan, Weingart, & Dillon-Merrill, 2012). Cultural backgrounds fundamentally shape how negotiators think about and behave during negotiations (Gelfand & Brett, 2004). This influence of culture on negotiation processes and outcomes has thus also received increasing research attention (e.g., Adair, Okumura, & Brett, 2001; Gelfand et al., 2001; Gunia, Brett, Nandkeolyar, & Kamdar, 2011; Liu, Friedman, Barry, Gelfand, & Zhang, 2012; Tinsley, 1998). These two burgeoning research streams, however, have developed largely independently. Indeed, a recent review chapter laments that although studying how culture and emotions interact in negotiations becomes increasingly important, empirical research on this topic is extremely scarce (Cropanzano et al., 2012). As a result, our understanding of the interplay of culture and emotions in negotiations is sorely underdeveloped.

Two exciting trends in recent research on negotiations are an increasing focus on the role of emotions and the role of culture. First, because of their mixed-motive nature, negotiations frequently invoke intense emotions (Cropanzano, Becker, & Feldman, 2012). Emotions convey important information about the thoughts, feelings, and intentions of negotiators and thus elicit behavioral responses from their counterparts (Barry, Fulmer, & Van Kleef, 2004; Morris & Kelmer, 2000). These social effects of emotions in negotiations have thus received increasing research attention (e.g., Filipowicz, Barsade, & Melwani, 2011; Kopelman, Rosette, & Thompson, 2006; Rothman, 2011; Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004a, 2006). Second, because of globalization, negotiations also frequently involve parties of different cultural backgrounds (Tinsley, Turan, Weingart, & Dillon-Merrill, 2012). Cultural backgrounds fundamentally shape how negotiators think about and behave during negotiations (Gelfand & Brett, 2004). This influence of culture on negotiation processes and outcomes has thus also received increasing research attention (e.g., Adair, Okumura, & Brett, 2001; Gelfand et al., 2001; Gunia, Brett, Nandkeolyar, & Kamdar, 2011; Liu, Friedman, Barry, Gelfand, & Zhang, 2012; Tinsley, 1998). These two burgeoning research streams, however, have developed largely independently. Indeed, a recent review chapter laments that although studying how culture and emotions interact in negotiations becomes increasingly important, empirical research on this topic is extremely scarce (Cropanzano et al., 2012). As a result, our understanding of the interplay of culture and emotions in negotiations is sorely underdeveloped.

Recently, researchers made a first step in addressing this gap in our understanding (Adam, Shirako, & Maddux, 2010; Kopelman & Rosette, 2008). They demonstrated the significant influence of the cultural background of the perceiver of the emotion expression on the social effects of emotions. In particular, they found that because angry and negative emotional displays are considered highly inappropriate in East Asian cultural contexts, East Asian negotiators concede less to angry counterparts than European American negotiators (Adam et al., 2010), and are less likely than Israeli negotiators to accept an offer from a counterpart displaying negative emotions (Kopelman & Rosette, 2008). We take a critical next step in this nascent research area by examining the influence of the cultural background of the expresser on the social effects of
emotions. As negotiations always involve at least two parties, the effects of expressing emotions such as anger, happiness, and sadness may depend not only on the cultural background of the perceiver but also on the cultural background of the expresser. Indeed, noticeable cultural cues like race can trigger stereotypes about the expresser’s demographic group (e.g., East Asian, European American, Hispanic, etc.), and these stereotypes in turn can influence how negotiations unfold (Tinsley et al., 2012). If we neglect a factor so intricately linked to today’s oftentimes multicultural negotiations, our ability to explain and predict the effects of expressing emotions is likely to be limited and culturally constrained.

The current research thus offers the first investigation of how the cultural background of the expresser influences the social effects of emotions in negotiations. Across four studies using different types of negotiation, different measures of negotiation outcomes, and different subject populations, we found consistent evidence that angry East Asian negotiators elicit greater cooperation from negotiation counterparts than angry European American negotiators. Our findings bring together research on the role of emotion and culture in negotiations and offer important contributions to the literatures on emotion, culture, and stereotypes. First, they contribute to the literature on the social effects of emotions in negotiations. This literature has explored the influence of several factors, including characteristics of the perceiver (e.g., Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004b), the emotion expression (e.g., Steinel, Van Kleef, & Harinck, 2008), and the situation (e.g., Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006). The characteristics of the expresser, however, have remained entirely unexplored even though they constitute an integral part of any negotiation. We provide the first investigation into their influence and show that they can play an important role in shaping the effects of emotional displays. Second, our findings contribute to the literature on the impact of culture on negotiations. This literature has typically studied cultural differences with respect to influence styles (e.g., Brett & Okumura, 1998), judgment biases (e.g., Gelfand et al., 2001), and mental models (e.g., Liu et al., 2012). Our findings highlight the value of extending our investigative lens from cognitive components to emotional elements when analyzing negotiations from a cultural angle. Finally, our results contribute to the literature on the effects of stereotype violations in interpersonal settings. This literature has typically found a backlash effect, which means that the cultural background of the expresser influences the social outcomes, and consequently shape the perceptions and expectations of the stereotyped person (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Greenwald et al., 2002). To illustrate, a negotiator may use a noticeable cue (e.g., Allred, Mallozzi, Matsui, & Raia, 1997; Baron, 1990; Carnevale & Isen, 1986;Forgas, 1998; Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996). More recently, researchers have examined the idea that emotions also have social effects—the effects of one person’s emotions on the thoughts, feelings, and actions of those who observe the expressions of these emotions. The dominant theoretical framework to understand these social effects of emotions is the social information (EASI) model (Van Kleef, 2009; Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2010; Van Kleef, Homan, & Cheshin, 2012).

Consistent with social-functional theorizing about emotions (Keltner & Haidt, 1999; Mesquita & Frijda, 1992; Oatley & Jenkins, 1992), the EASI model proposes that expressed emotions not only elicit emotional responses in others but also convey important information about behavioral intentions and attitudes about people, objects, and events. For example, an expression of guilt may lead the perceiver to infer that the expresser feels bad about a past wrongdoing and intends to repair the harm, which makes the perceiver adjust his or her behavior accordingly. Thus, the EASI model is ultimately concerned with the perceiver’s action tendencies in response to an emotion expression (Van Kleef, 2009; Van Kleef et al., 2010), and it conceptualizes these tendencies in terms of Horney’s classic distinction between “moving toward,” “moving away,” and “moving against” (Horney, 1945).

Negotiation scholars have used the EASI model to explain the social effects of emotions in negotiations. Most studies on this topic have focused on anger, which is also the focus of the current research and arguably the most common emotion in conflict situations (Alfred, 1999; Sinaceur, Adam, Van Kleef, & Galinsky, 2013; Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Sinaceur, Van Kleef, Neale, Adam, & Haag, 2011; Steinel et al., 2008; Van Dijk, Van Kleef, Steinel, & Van Beest, 2008; Van Kleef & De Dreu, 2010; Van Kleef et al., 2004a). Overall, these studies have shown that “when facing a partner expressing anger in a competitive context, perceivers tend to move toward their partner and increase their cooperative effort” (Van Kleef et al., 2010, p. 76). That is, expressing anger typically elicits greater cooperation (e.g., larger concessions, a greater willingness to cooperate, a less selfish division of resources, etc.) compared with expressing other emotions, such as happiness, or remaining emotionless. This cooperative action tendency is driven by angry negotiators being perceived as tougher and more threatening because anger acts as a warning signal that they will let the conflict escalate and risk an impasse unless their counterpart starts cooperating more (Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Sinaceur et al., 2011; Van Kleef et al., 2004a).

**Introducing the Role of the Expresser’s Cultural Background**

We argue that this signaling value of anger and the resultant behavioral response of the perceiver may vary depending on the cultural background of the anger expresser. This is because cultural backgrounds trigger cultural stereotypes, that is, cognitive structures containing knowledge, beliefs, and expectations about a cultural category (Hamilton & Sherman, 1994; Tinsley et al., 2012). These stereotypes are automatically activated by noticeable, culturally relevant indicators of the stereotyped person’s demographic group, such as race (Brewer & Feinstei, 1999; Fiske, 1998), and consequently shape the perceptions and expectations of the stereotyped person (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Greenwald et al., 2002). To illustrate, a negotiator may use a noticeable cue (e.g.,
race) to assign the counterpart to a specific demographic group (e.g., East Asian) and then use his or her stereotypes about that group to infer characteristics of the counterpart (e.g., East Asians are calm; hence, the counterpart will be calm). These stereotype-based inferences consequently shape the negotiation process and outcomes (Tinsley et al., 2012).

The most relevant cultural stereotypes in the context of the social effects of emotions are arguably those relating to how openly and frequently members of different cultural groups express emotions. We reason that such stereotypes likely exist because cultural backgrounds and emotional expressions play key roles in social perceptions (e.g., Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Greenwald et al., 2002; Keltner & Haidt, 1999), and one important function of stereotypes is precisely to facilitate, disambiguate, and simplify social perceptions (e.g., Allport, 1954; Fiske, 1993; Stangor, 1995). Somewhat surprisingly, however, no study has directly assessed whether people actually hold these stereotypes. The sparse and indirect empirical evidence points to people holding stereotypes of East Asians being emotionally inexpressive and European Americans being emotionally expressive. For instance, in classic studies on racial stereotypes, Chinese and Japanese tended to be associated with emotionally inexpressive traits (e.g., meditative, reserved, and quiet), whereas Americans and Italians tended to be associated with emotionally expressive traits (e.g., impulsive, ostentatious, and passionate) (Gilbert, 1951; Karlins, Coffman, & Walters, 1969; Katz & Braly, 1933). Similarly, a study on emotion recognition accuracy across cultures found that European American faces are misjudged more often as angry and less often as neutral compared with East Asian faces (Elfenbein, Mandal, Ambady, Harizuka, & Kumar, 2002). Because people interpret stimuli in a way consistent with their preexisting stereotypes (Stangor, 1995), this finding suggests that European Americans are stereotyped to be emotionally inexpressive, especially with respect to anger, but East Asians are stereotyped to be emotionally inexpressive. We therefore predict:

**Hypothesis 1:** East Asians are stereotyped to be emotionally inexpressive, and European Americans are stereotyped to be emotionally expressive.

We contend that the stereotype of East Asians being emotionally inexpressive and European Americans being emotionally expressive has important implications for the signaling value of anger expressions in negotiations, as specified by the EASI model. To develop our hypotheses, we draw from research on attribution theory in social perceptions. This research shows that the cause of a behavior is perceived to be stronger if the behavior occurs despite the presence of factors that should have made it unlikely (e.g., Jones & Davis, 1965; Kelley, 1973). For example, obese people are stereotyped to be in poor physical shape, so their weight may be perceived as a factor that should make the completion of a marathon unlikely. If an obese person actually completes a marathon in the same time as an athletic person, the underlying cause of the behavior, that is, the runner is tenacious and determined, may be perceived as stronger for the obese person than for the athletic person.

In the context of the current research, East Asians are stereotyped to be emotionally inexpressive, so their ethnicity may be perceived as a factor that should make any open expression of anger unlikely. If an East Asian negotiator actually expresses the same amount of anger as a European American negotiator, the underlying cause of the behavior as identified by prior research, that is, the anger expresser is tough and poses a serious threat of an impasse and an escalation of conflict unless the counterpart cooperates more (e.g., Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Sinaceur et al., 2011; Van Kleef et al., 2004a) may be perceived as stronger for the East Asian negotiator than for the European American negotiator. In other words, the same display of anger may have a stronger signaling value when expressed by an East Asian negotiator rather than a European American negotiator. The EASI model would thus suggest that angry East Asian negotiators are perceived as tougher and more threatening by their counterparts, and consequently elicit greater cooperative responses compared with angry European American negotiators. Overall, we predict the following:

**Hypothesis 2:** Angry East Asian negotiators will elicit greater cooperation from negotiation counterparts than angry European American negotiators.

It is also important to discuss a potential boundary condition of our key prediction that angry East Asian negotiators will elicit greater cooperation from negotiation counterparts than angry European American negotiators. This effect is predicated on negotiation counterparts holding the stereotype that East Asians are emotionally inexpressive and European Americans are emotionally expressive. Although we predict that people generally hold this stereotype (see Hypothesis 1), we do not predict that all people hold this stereotype. If our theoretical model is correct, our key prediction as stated in Hypothesis 2 should emerge only when negotiation counterparts actually hold this stereotype. We therefore predict the following:

**Hypothesis 3:** The effect stated in Hypothesis 2 is mediated by angry East Asian negotiators being perceived as tougher and more threatening than angry European American negotiators.

**Hypothesis 4:** The effect stated in Hypothesis 2 occurs when negotiation counterparts hold the stereotype of East Asians being emotionally inexpressive and European Americans being emotionally expressive, but the effect does not occur when negotiation counterparts do not hold this stereotype.

**Overview of Studies**

We tested our hypotheses across one pilot study and four negotiation studies using different types of negotiation, different operationalizations of cooperation, and different subject populations. We conducted the pilot study to test Hypothesis 1 that people hold the stereotype of East Asians being emotionally inexpressive and European Americans being emotionally expressive. We then conducted four negotiation studies to test the remaining hypotheses. In a computer-mediated negotiation study involving participants from an online subject pool (Study 1), we tested whether negotiators report a greater intention to cooperate when faced with an angry East Asian counterpart than with an angry European American or an angry Hispanic counterpart. In a negotiation scenario study involving a different set of participants from the same online subject pool (Study 2), we tested whether negotiators make greater concessions when faced with an angry East Asian counterpart than...
with an angry European American counterpart, but the same amount of concessions when the East Asian and European American counterparts are emotionally neutral. In a face-to-face negotiation study involving university students (Study 3), we tested whether negotiators claim less value when faced with an angry East Asian counterpart than with an angry European American counterpart, and whether this effect is mediated by the extent to which the angry counterpart is perceived as tough and threatening. Finally, in a multiple-rounds computer-mediated negotiation study involving a different set of participants from the same online subject pool as in Studies 1 and 2 (Study 4), we tested whether negotiators award their counterpart a greater payoff when faced with an angry East Asian counterpart than with an angry European American counterpart, and whether this effect only emerges when negotiators hold the stereotype of East Asians being emotionally inexpressive and European Americans being emotionally expressive.

Pilot Study

Method

Participants and measures. We first ran a pilot study to test Hypothesis 1 and explore whether people hold stereotypes about the emotional expressivity of East Asians and European Americans. We recruited 70 people (47 men, 23 women; average age = 28.81 years) from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk website to participate in a short stereotype questionnaire. All participants were from the United States, and the vast majority of them (82.6%) were of European ethnicity.

In the questionnaire, we asked participants to rate the extent to which they think people from a certain cultural background are likely to be emotionally expressive in general and likely to express anger and frustration in particular. We asked participants about East Asians (α = .85) and European Americans (α = .72) because these two cultural groups are the focus of our hypotheses. We also asked participants about Hispanics (α = .75) because we were planning to use Hispanics as a control group in Study 1. The order of presentation for these three cultural groups was randomized. The response scales for all items ranged from 1 (do not agree at all) to 5 (agree very much).

Results

Results indicated that East Asians are stereotyped to be significantly less emotionally expressive than European Americans (M = 2.49, SD = 0.96 vs. M = 3.81, SD = 0.79), t(69) = 9.22, p < .001, and Hispanics (M = 3.91, SD = 0.75), t(69) = 10.12, p < .001. Stereotypes about the emotional expressivity of European Americans and Hispanics did not differ, t(69) = 0.83, p > .40. Furthermore, and in support of Hypothesis 1, a one-sample t test showed that participants’ ratings of emotional expressivity were significantly below the midpoint of the scale for East Asians, t(69) = 4.40, p < .001, and significantly above the midpoint of the scale for European Americans, t(69) = 8.62, p < .001. Overall, the results strongly support Hypothesis 1 that people hold the stereotype of East Asians being emotionally inexpressive and European Americans being emotionally expressive. We therefore proceeded with testing our key hypotheses about the impact of the expresser’s culture on the social effects of anger in negotiations.

Study 1

Method

Experimental design and participants. Study 1 had three between-subjects conditions in which we varied the cultural background of the anger expresser (East Asian vs. European American vs. Hispanic). We included the Hispanic condition as a control group to determine whether our predominantly European American participants cooperate more with angry East Asian counterparts in particular, and not with angry counterparts from any foreign culture in general. We recruited 98 people (64 men, 34 women; average age = 32.01 years) from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk website to participate in an online study. The sample was independent of the sample used for the pilot study. All participants were from the United States, and the vast majority of them (79.6%) were of European ethnicity.

Procedure. Participants were told they would be randomly matched with another user of Amazon’s Mechanical Turk website to conduct an online negotiation. In reality, they negotiated with a simulated counterpart. All participants were presented with a negotiation scenario in an organizational context. The scenario was a shorter version of the scenario used by Van Kleef and colleagues (e.g., Van Kleef & Côté, 2007; Van Kleef et al., 2004b). In the scenario, participants played the role of a project manager of their company’s website. Their job was to hire an IT company to adapt the website to the latest technical standards, and they were told that they estimated $90,000 to be a reasonable price for the required services. One company, Tech Incorporated, was presented as the best service provider. However, Tech Incorporated’s bid was for $120,000, and the participants were therefore asked to negotiate with Tech Incorporated’s representative to come to an agreement on price.

After reading the negotiation background information, participants were asked to make a first offer and then wait for their counterpart’s reaction to their offer. After a brief waiting period, their counterpart sent them the following message: “Wow, this offer makes me really angry... I think 120k is really not too much to ask, so I expect a better offer. I’m pretty pissed off!” The anger communication was adapted from prior research (Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Kleef et al., 2004b). After they received the message, participants were told that the negotiation was over and were asked questions about their behavioral intentions.

Culture manipulation. Before participants were presented with any background information about the negotiation, they read that the purpose of the study was to investigate the possibility that knowing about one’s negotiation counterpart influences negotiation processes and outcomes. Therefore, participants were asked to complete a short questionnaire in which they provided information.

---

1 Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) is an online platform with an integrated compensation system that allows users to outsource tasks—such as experiments, surveys, or coding assignments—to a large participant pool. Data collected through MTurk have been shown to be as reliable as data obtained through traditional methods for social science research (for more details, see Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011).
such as their first name, age, gender, hair color, ethnicity, and the like. They were told that the computer would randomly select a subset of their answers and send that information to their counterpart. They were also told that they would receive a subset of their counterpart’s answers to the same questions.

After providing their answers, participants were presented with information about their counterpart, which contained the culture manipulation, along with the other background information about the scenario (see above). In the European American expresser’s culture condition, the counterpart’s first name was Jason, his hair color was brown, his country of birth was the United States, his ethnicity was Caucasian, and his high school was called Brighton High. In the East Asian expresser’s culture condition, the counterpart’s first name was Josuke (a common male Japanese first name), his hair color was black, his country of birth was Japan, his ethnicity was East Asian, and his high school was called Musashino Joshi. In the Hispanic expresser’s culture condition, the counterpart’s first name was Felipe (a common male Mexican first name), his hair color was brown, his country of birth was Mexico, his ethnicity was Latino, and his high school was called IES Menendez. The information about the contact also included details that had nothing to do with culture and that were identical across conditions (i.e., gender and hobbies).

Dependent measures. The main dependent variable was the participants’ intention to cooperate with their counterpart if the negotiation had continued. We assessed participants’ intention to cooperate with a scale consisting of four items (e.g., “If the negotiation continued, I would have a flexible and cooperative attitude towards my counterpart”; “If the negotiation continued, I would try to meet the needs of my counterpart”; $\alpha = .75$). A higher number thus indicated a greater intention to cooperate by the participant.

After the negotiation, participants completed a culture manipulation check that asked them to recall their counterpart’s cultural background. To be sure that participants perceived their counterpart as equally angry, we also asked participants to rate the extent to which they thought that their counterpart expressed anger, frustration, and annoyance ($\alpha = .84$). The response scales for all items ranged from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much).

Results

Manipulation check. Five participants (one in the European American expresser’s culture condition, two in the East Asian expresser’s culture condition, and two in the Hispanic expresser’s culture condition) did not correctly recall their counterpart’s cultural background. These five participants (5.1% of all participants) were dropped from subsequent analyses. Retaining these participants yielded the same pattern of results.

Furthermore, a one-sample $t$ test showed that participants’ ratings on the anger perception measure were significantly above the midpoint of the scale ($M = 4.24$, $SD = 0.81$), $t(92) = 14.74$, $p < .001$, suggesting that participants clearly perceived the counterpart as angry. There was no effect of the expresser’s culture manipulation on the anger perception measure, $F(1, 92) = 0.38$, $p > .67$, indicating that participants in all three conditions perceived the counterpart as equally angry.

Intention to cooperate. We submitted the intention to cooperate to a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA). Our analysis yielded the predicted effect for experimental condition, $F(1, 92) = 3.44$, $p = .04$, $\eta^2_p = .07$. Specifically, and in support of Hypothesis 2, participants indicated that they would cooperate significantly more when confronted with an angry East Asian counterpart than with an angry European American counterpart ($M = 4.18$, $SD = 0.92$ vs. $M = 3.66$, $SD = 1.10$), $F(1, 66) = 4.47$, $p = .04$, $\eta^2_p = .06$, and with an angry Hispanic counterpart ($M = 3.49$, $SD = 1.26$), $F(1, 59) = 6.08$, $p = .02$, $\eta^2_p = .09$. The intention to cooperate did not differ significantly in the latter two conditions, $F(1, 58) = 0.30$, $p > .58$ (see Figure 1).

Discussion

The results from Study 1 provide initial evidence for our hypothesis that negotiators faced with angry East Asian counterparts are more likely to cooperate than negotiators faced with angry European American counterparts. The fact that negotiators indicated that they would also cooperate more with an angry East Asian than an angry Hispanic counterpart rules out the possibility that our predominantly European American participants would cooperate more with angry counterparts from any foreign culture.

Study 2 was designed to remedy some of the weaknesses of Study 1 and extend the results in a number of ways. First, rather than measure behavioral intentions to cooperate, we asked participants to make an actual offer in the negotiation, thus providing a more concrete dependent variable. Second, we sought to implement a more subtle manipulation of culture. Rather than presenting false information about an ostensibly real negotiation counterpart, Study 2 wove the manipulation of culture into the scenario description. Finally, we included a no-anger condition in Study 2 to rule out the possibility that negotiators simply make more concessions to East Asians in general rather than to angry East Asians in particular.
Study 2

Method

Experimental design and participants. Study 2 had a 2 (anger: anger vs. no anger) × 2 (expresser’s culture: European American vs. East Asian) factorial between-subjects design. We recruited 120 people (55 men, 65 women; average age = 33.24 years) from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk website to participate in an online study. The sample was independent of the samples used for the pilot study and Study 1. All participants were from the United States, and the majority of them (80.8%) were of European ethnicity.

Procedure. Participants were presented with a longer version of the same basic negotiation scenario as in Study 1. However, instead of leading participants to believe that they were to negotiate with another participant, they were simply told to read the scenario carefully, take the role seriously, and imagine how they would react in the situation.

Culture manipulation. As part of the negotiation background information, participants were presented with information about their contact at Tech Incorporated. This information contained the culture manipulation. In the European American expresser’s culture condition, the contact was named Jason and described as an American citizen who grew up in New York and went to New York University. In the East Asian expresser’s culture condition, the contact was named Hiroshi (a common male Japanese first name) and described as a Japanese citizen who grew up in Tokyo and went to Tokyo University. The information about the contact also included details that had nothing to do with culture and that remained consistent across conditions (e.g., the contact’s age, college major, and current title and position at Tech Incorporated). The manipulation was thus fully embedded in the negotiation scenario, and it did not require a cover story.

Anger manipulation. After reading the negotiation background information, participants were told that they are connected on the phone with their counterpart and that their character just proposed $90,000. In the anger condition, the counterpart reacted in an irritated manner to the proposal, saying that it is unacceptable. Subsequently, the counterpart said: “This offer makes me really angry. I expect a better offer.” Participants were then told that their counterpart remained clearly upset throughout the remainder of the conversation. In the no-anger condition, the counterpart reacted in a nonemotional manner to the proposal, saying that it is unacceptable. Subsequently, the counterpart said: “I expect a better offer.” Participants were then told that their counterpart remained nonemotional throughout the remainder of the conversation. The anger manipulation was again adapted from prior research (Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Kleef & Côté, 2007).

Dependent measures. At the end of the phone conversation, participants read that their counterpart asked them to send their final offer in writing. The main dependent variable was concession-making, operationalized as the participants’ final offer minus their initial offer of $90,000. A higher number thus indicated larger concessions and greater cooperation by the participant.

After the negotiation, participants completed a culture manipulation check that asked them to recall their counterpart’s cultural background. Participants also completed an anger manipulation check that asked them to rate the extent to which they thought that their counterpart expressed anger, frustration, and annoyance (α = .95). Finally, we asked participants to rate the extent to which they had been able to imagine themselves in the situation to make sure that any differences between the conditions would not be due to varying degrees of involvement in the situation. The response scales for all items ranged from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much).

Results

Manipulation checks. Eight participants (three in the European American expresser’s culture condition, five in the East Asian expresser’s culture condition) did not correctly recall their counterpart’s cultural background. These eight participants (6.7% of all participants) were dropped from subsequent analyses. Retaining these participants yielded the same pattern of results.

Perceivers indicated that their counterparts expressed more anger, frustration, and annoyance in the anger condition than in the no-anger condition (M = 4.04, SD = 0.77 vs. M = 1.79, SD = 0.92), F(1, 111) = 191.36, p < .001, ηp^2 = .64. Expresser’s culture did not have a main effect or interaction effect on the anger manipulation check (all Fs < 0.88, ps > .35), indicating that participants in both culture conditions perceived the counterpart as equally angry.

Finally, a one-sample t test showed that participants’ ratings on the imagination item were significantly above the midpoint of the scale (M = 4.15, SD = 0.88), t(111) = 13.81, p < .001, suggesting that participants were able to imagine themselves in the negotiation scenario. There was no main effect or interaction effect due to the expresser’s culture manipulation or the anger manipulation on the imagination item (all Fs < 1.07, ps > .30), indicating that participants in all conditions were equally able to imagine themselves in the scenario. This result rules out the possibility that differences between the conditions were due to varying degrees of involvement in the situation.

Concession-making. We submitted concession-making to a 2 (anger: anger vs. no anger) × 2 (expresser’s culture: European American vs. East Asian) between-subjects ANOVA. Consistent with prior research (e.g., Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Kleef et al., 2004a), there was a main effect for anger, such that negotiators made larger concessions to angry than to nonangry counterparts (M = 9,226.30, SD = 6,032.49 vs. M = 6,790.91, SD = 5,348.67), F(1, 111) = 6.35, p = .01, ηp^2 = .06. More importantly for the purposes of the current research, there was an interaction effect for anger and expresser’s culture, F(1, 111) = 4.47, p = .04, ηp^2 = .04. Specifically, and replicating the results from Study 1, negotiators made significantly larger concessions to angry East Asian counterparts than to nonangry European American counterparts (M = 11,726.92, SD = 5,120.43 vs. M = 7,129.00, SD = 6,003.66), F(1, 56) = 9.45, p < .01, ηp^2 = .15. However, negotiators made the same amount of concessions to nonangry East Asian counterparts as to nonangry European American counterparts (M = 6,884.62, SD = 4,693.20 vs. M = 6,706.90, SD = 5,957.46), F(1, 54) = 0.02, p > .90 (see Figure 2).

Discussion

The results from Study 2 provide further support for our hypothesis that angry East Asian negotiators elicit greater coopera-
expression than angry European American negotiators. Importantly, nonangry East Asian negotiators did not elicit greater cooperation than nonangry European American negotiators. This result helps rule out the possibility that the findings in Study 1 were driven by negotiators cooperating more with East Asian counterparts than with European American counterparts in general.

Study 3 builds on the results of Studies 1 and 2 in several ways. First, although the use of a computer-mediated negotiation in Study 1 and a negotiation scenario in Study 2 allowed us to have careful control over the culture manipulation and how anger is expressed, it did not provide a realistic simulation of a face-to-face negotiation. Thus, in Study 3 we used an actual face-to-face negotiation in which negotiators simply observed (rather than read about) the cultural background of the expresser and that allowed for more natural expressions of anger. Furthermore, we wanted to explore whether the impact of the expresser’s culture holds for not only European American perceivers (who constituted the vast majority of our samples in Studies 1 and 2) but also East Asian perceivers. We therefore recruited a sample that was approximately half European American and half East Asian in Study 3. Finally, we sought to provide evidence for the hypothesized mechanism as stated in Hypothesis 3. Thus, we examined whether being perceived as tough and threatening mediates the impact of the expresser’s cultural background.

Study 3

Method

Experimental design and participants. Study 3 had a 2 (anger: anger vs. no anger) × 2 (expresser’s culture: European American vs. East Asian) factorial between-subjects design. Two hundred eighty-eight university students (122 men, 166 women; average age = 20.58) in the United States participated in the study. One hundred forty-five participants (73 expressers, 72 perceivers) of European ethnicity; they were from the United States (88), China (21), South Korea (13), Canada (five), Taiwan (five), Singapore (four), Indonesia (two), Thailand (two), Japan (one), Malaysia (one), and the Philippines (one).

Procedure. Participants were organized into same-sex dyads and randomly assigned to either the role of “Student 1” or “Student 2” according to a double-blind procedure in which neither the participants nor the experimenters knew to which condition each participant was assigned. The background information for the negotiation was adapted from the negotiation exercise “Student Project” (Dispute Resolution Research Center, 2011). The exercise had a high degree of mundane realism for our student sample as the topic of the negotiation concerned the terms of a class project.

Figure 2. Perceiver’s concession-making as a function of experimental condition (no anger vs. anger) and expresser’s cultural background (European American vs. East Asian) in Study 2. Error bars represent ± 1 standard error of the mean.

Specifically, the negotiation consisted of six issues: topic of study, type of project, method of presentation, completion date, time investment in the project, and meetings times. Participants were given a payoff table along with their role information, and they were told that the objective was to earn as many points as possible. To enhance involvement, participants were informed that the more points they earned, the greater their chances of winning additional incentive pay. They were told that if no agreement was reached within 20 min, the outcome would be considered as an impasse, and they would be ineligible for incentive pay.

Anger manipulation. After reading their role instructions, participants were given a set of negotiation recommendations that contained the anger manipulation. The anger manipulation was adapted from work by Kopelman et al. (2006) and Sinaceur and Tiedens (2006). Participants who role-played Student 1 were randomly assigned to one of the two anger conditions. To maximize consistency across the two conditions, participants in both the no-anger and the anger conditions were told that they needed to use their emotions to negotiate effectively and obtain a better outcome. However, the two conditions differed in terms of how participants were advised to use their emotions. In the anger condition, participants were told that negotiation experts recommend expressing anger in negotiations. Participants were given specific instructions about how to express anger, such as raising one’s voice, banging one’s fist on the table, and using aggressive sentences. In the no-anger condition, participants were told that negotiation experts recommend hiding emotions in negotiations. Participants were given specific instructions about how to remain emotionally neutral, such as not raising one’s voice, minimizing facial expressions, and using neutral body language. Participants who role-played student 2 were not given any emotion instructions.

Dependent measures. The main dependent variable was the percentage of the dyad’s value that was claimed by the anger expresser (e.g., Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006). The points earned by the expresser for the six negotiation issues were added together, and this sum was divided by the total number of points created by the dyad. A higher number thus indicated greater cooperation by the perceivers.

After the negotiation, perceivers rated the extent to which they thought the other student in the negotiation was tough and threatening (α = .77) (Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Sinaceur et al., 2011; Van Kleef et al., 2004a). They also completed a manipulation check, which consisted of two scales: First, perceivers were asked
to rate the extent to which they thought that their counterpart expressed anger, frustration, and annoyance (α = .92). Second, perceivers were asked to rate the extent to which they perceived that their counterpart engaged in five types of behaviors that conveyed anger (e.g., “The other student gesticulated aggressively”; “The other student banged his/her fist on the table”) (α = .83). The response scales for all items ranged from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much).

Results

Manipulation check. Perceivers indicated that their counterparts expressed more anger, frustration, and annoyance in the anger condition than in the no-anger condition (M = 2.67, SD = 1.33 vs. M = 1.37, SD = 0.66), t(1, 143) = 50.12, p < .001, η² = .27. Similarly, perceivers indicated that their counterparts engaged more in anger-conveying behaviors in the anger condition than in the no-anger condition (M = 1.80, SD = 0.88 vs. M = 1.19, SD = 0.31), t(1, 143) = 28.90, p < .001, η² = .18. Neither expresser’s culture nor perceiver’s culture had a main effect or interaction effect on perceiver’s anger ratings for either manipulation check (all Fs < 0.78, ps > .42).

Impasses. There were three impasses. One occurred in the no-anger condition; two occurred in the anger condition.

Percentage of value claimed. We submitted the anger expresser’s percentage of value claimed to a 2 (anger: anger vs. no anger) × 2 (expresser’s culture: European American vs. East Asian) × 2 (perceiver’s culture: European American vs. East Asian) between-subjects ANOVA. Consistent with prior research (e.g., Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Kleef et al., 2004a), there was a main effect for anger, such that negotiators cooperated more with an angry than with a nonangry counterpart (M = 53.38%, SD = 6.68% vs. M = 50.18%, SD = 7.89%), t(1, 140) = 7.99, p < .01, η² = .06. Also consistent with prior research (e.g., Adam et al., 2010; Kopelman & Rosette, 2008), there was an interaction effect for anger and perceiver’s culture, such that expressing anger compared with not expressing anger elicited more cooperation from European American perceivers (M = 54.80%, SD = 5.18% vs. M = 47.53%, SD = 8.15%), but less cooperation from East Asian perceivers (M = 51.74%, SD = 7.85% vs. M = 52.54%, SD = 6.93%), t(1, 140) = 9.16, p < .01, η² = .06.

More importantly for the purposes of the current research, there was also an interaction effect for anger and expresser’s culture, F(1, 140) = 4.40, p = .04, η² = .03. Specifically, and replicating the results from Studies 1 and 2, negotiators cooperated more with angry East Asian counterparts than with angry European American counterparts (M = 55.18%, SD = 5.74% vs. M = 51.91%, SD = 7.10%), t(1, 68) = 4.30, p = .04, η² = .06. However, negotiators cooperated as much with nonangry East Asian counterparts as with nonangry European American counterparts. If anything, there was a distinct, albeit nonsignificant, tendency for negotiators to cooperate less with nonangry East Asian counterparts than with nonangry European American counterparts (M = 48.76%, SD = 8.34% vs. M = 51.76%, SD = 7.14%), t(1, 71) = 2.67, p = .11, η² = .04 (see Figure 3).

Finally, neither the interaction for expresser’s culture and perceiver’s culture nor the three-way interaction for anger, expresser’s culture, and perceiver’s culture were significant (both Fs < 0.24, ps > .63), indicating that the influence of the expresser’s culture did not depend on whether the perceiver was European American or East Asian.

Mediation analysis. To examine Hypothesis 3 that the interaction effect for anger and expresser’s culture is driven by the perceiver’s perception of the expresser being tough and threatening, we tested for mediated moderation following the bootstrapping procedure outlined by Preacher and Hayes (2004, 2008). First, and consistent with the ANOVA results, the interaction effect for anger and expresser’s culture predicted concession-making (β = .88), t(138) = 2.58, p = .01. Second, the interaction effect for anger and expresser’s culture predicted the perceiver’s perception of the expresser being tough and threatening (β = .82), t(138) = 2.46, p = .02, such that angry East Asian negotiators were perceived as tougher and more threatening than angry European American negotiators. Third, the perceiver’s perception of the expresser being tough and threatening predicted concession-making (β = .42), t(140) = 5.38, p < .001. Finally, when including both the interaction effect for anger and expresser’s culture and the perceiver’s perception of the expresser being tough and threatening, the perceiver’s perception of the expresser being tough and threatening remained significant (β = .36), t(137) = 4.35, p < .001, whereas the interaction effect for anger and expresser’s culture became nonsignificant (β = .62), t(137) = 1.91, p = .06. The bootstrap test for our mediated moderation model with 5,000 iterations yielded a 95% bias-corrected and accelerated bootstrap confidence interval from .002 to .045 (i.e., it did not include zero). These results indicate that the perceiver’s perception of the expresser being tough and threatening mediated the interaction effect for anger and expresser’s culture on concession-making (see Figure 4).

Discussion

The results from Study 3 further demonstrate that expressing anger elicits significantly more cooperation when the anger expresser is East Asian rather than European American. They also showed that this effect of the expresser’s culture holds for both East
Asian and European American perceivers. Finally, they elucidate the mechanism underlying this effect—angry East Asian negotiators are perceived as tougher and more threatening than angry European American negotiators, and that is why they elicit greater cooperation from negotiation counterparts.

Whereas Studies 1, 2, and 3 have established the influence of the expresser’s culture on the social effects of anger and its underlying mechanism, Study 4 demonstrates an important boundary condition of this influence. As stated in Hypothesis 4, if the effect is predicated on the stereotype of East Asians being emotionally inexpressive and European Americans being emotionally expressive, the effect should emerge only among negotiators who hold this stereotype. Thus, we measured stereotypes about the emotional expressivity of East Asians and European Americans prior to the negotiation to see whether holding the above-mentioned stereotype moderates the impact of the expresser’s culture.

**Study 4**

**Method**

**Experimental design and participants.** Study 4 had two between-subjects conditions in which we varied the cultural background of the anger expresser (East Asian vs. European American). We recruited 110 people (52 men, 58 women; average age = 32.27 years) from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk website to participate in an online study. The sample was independent of the samples used for the pilot study and Studies 1 and 2. All participants were from the United States, and the majority of them (83.6%) were of European ethnicity.

**Procedure.** Participants took part in the study on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk website and were told they would complete two separate studies. The “first study” contained the stereotype assessment, and the “second study” contained the negotiation task.

The stereotype assessment was described as a pilot study to measure people’s beliefs about different demographic groups. Participants rated the extent to which they think people from a certain demographic group are likely to be emotionally expressive in general and likely to express anger and frustration in particular. To minimize possible carryover effects and suspicions that the stereotype assessment is related to the negotiation task, we asked participants not only about East Asians ($\alpha = .77$) and European Americans ($\alpha = .72$) but also about other cultural groups (e.g., Spanish, African Americans) and various demographic groups that had nothing to do with culture (e.g., women, the elderly). The order of presentation for these demographic groups was randomized. The response scales for all items ranged from 1 (do not agree at all) to 5 (agree very much).

After completing the stereotype assessment, participants were told they would engage in a computer-mediated negotiation with another participant. In reality, the other participant’s behavior was simulated by the computer in order to ensure consistent behaviors from participants’ “negotiation partners.” To increase realism and further minimize possible carryover effects, participants had to wait between the stereotype assessment and the negotiation task while the computer was supposedly looking for another participant to act as the negotiation counterpart. The negotiation task itself was adapted from prior research (e.g., Adam et al., 2010; Sinaceur et al., 2013, 2011; Van Kleef & Côté, 2007; Van Kleef et al., 2004a, 2004b). It captured typical characteristics of real-life negotiations, that is, multiple issues differing in utility to the negotiator, information about one’s own payoffs only, and the typical offer-counteroffer sequence.

Participants were told that they would be randomly assigned to play the role of either a seller or a buyer of a consignment of mobile phones. All participants acted as the seller. They had to negotiate three issues: the price of the phones, the warranty period, and the service contract. They were shown a payoff table displaying the number of points they could get for each issue. There were nine levels of agreement for each issue. Level 1 yielded the maximum number of points; Level 9 yielded the minimum number of points. The objective was to earn as many points as possible. To enhance involvement, participants were repeatedly informed that the more points they earned, the greater their chances of winning additional incentive pay. They were also told that they had to reach an agreement to qualify for the incentive pay.

Participants and their simulated counterparts then exchanged offers during each of a maximum of six rounds. If no agreement was reached after Round 6, the negotiation was stopped. The computer always made the first offer and always followed the same predetermined sequence of offers. Specifically, over six negotiation rounds the computer proposed the following levels of agreement for price issue, the service issue, and the warranty issue, respectively: 8-7-8 (Round 1), 8-7-7 (Round 2), 8-6-7 (Round 3), 7-6-7 (Round 4), 7-6-6 (Round 5), and 6-6-6 (Round 6). Prior research has shown that this concession-making strategy has face validity (De Dreu & Van Lange, 1995).

To ensure that the counterpart would be perceived as angry, participants were told before the start of the negotiation that one goal of the study was to examine the effects of having information about the counterpart and his or her intentions. They were informed that the computer randomly determined that they would receive information about their counterpart’s intentions, but the counterpart would not receive information about their intentions. After Rounds 1, 3, and 5, participants received predetermined
messages from their simulated counterparts. These statements contained the intentions of the counterpart as well as expressions of anger (see the Appendix). The statements and the intervals between them were identical to those used in previous research (e.g., Adam et al., 2010; Van Kleef et al., 2004a).

**Culture manipulation.** The culture manipulation was similar to the culture manipulation for Study 1: As participants were told that one goal of the study was to examine the effects of having information about the counterpart, participants were asked to complete a short questionnaire in which they provided information about themselves before they read the negotiation background information. They were told that the computer would randomly select a subset of their answers and send that information to their counterpart. They were also told that they would receive a subset of their counterpart’s answers to the same questions. After providing their answers, participants were presented with information about their counterpart, which contained the culture manipulation, along with the other background information about the scenario (see above). As was the case for Study 1, in the European American expresser’s culture condition, the counterpart’s first name was Jason, his hair color was brown, his country of birth was the United States, his ethnicity was Caucasian, and his high school was called Brighton High. In the East Asian expresser’s culture condition, the counterpart’s first name was Hiroshi, his hair color was black, his country of birth was Japan, his ethnicity was East Asian, and his high school was called Musashino Joshi. The information about the contact also included details that had nothing to do with culture and that were identical across conditions (i.e., gender and hobbies).

**Dependent measures.** The main dependent variable was the anger expresser’s individual gain (e.g., Adam et al., 2010; Sinaceur et al., 2013, 2011). The points demanded by the perceiver for the three negotiation issues were added together, and this sum was deducted from the maximum number of points possible. A higher number thus indicated a greater payoff for the anger expresser and greater cooperation by the perceiver.

After the negotiation, participants completed a culture manipulation check that asked them to recall their counterpart’s cultural background. To be sure that participants perceived their counterpart as angry, we also asked participants to rate the extent to which they thought that their counterpart expressed anger, frustration, and annoyance (α = .89). The response scales for all items ranged from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much).

**Results**

**Treatment of data.** Consistent with the results from the pilot study, a one-sample t test showed that participants’ ratings were significantly below the midpoint of the scale for East Asians (M = 2.40, SD = 0.94), t(109) = 6.74, p < .001, and significantly above the midpoint of the scale for European Americans (M = 3.50, SD = 0.84), t(109) = 6.29, p < .001, suggesting that East Asians and European Americans are generally stereotyped to be emotionally inexpressive and emotionally expressive, respectively. To test whether the influence of the expresser’s cultural background depends on whether people hold the stereotype of East Asians being emotionally inexpressive and European Americans being emotionally expressive, we divided the sample into two groups: a group that holds this stereotype and a group that does not. We considered participants to hold the stereotype if they rated East Asians as emotionally inexpressive (i.e., a mean score of less than 3 on the Emotional Expressivity scale, where 3 meant “agree”) and European Americans as emotionally expressive (i.e., a mean score of equal to or more than 3 on the Emotional Expressivity scale). We considered participants to not hold the stereotype if they rated both cultural groups as emotionally inexpressive or both cultural groups as emotionally expressive (only two participants rated East Asians as emotionally expressive and European Americans as emotionally inexpressive). This procedure yielded 55 participants who held the stereotype, and 55 participants who did not.

**Manipulation check.** Six participants (four in the European American expresser’s culture condition, two in the East Asian expresser’s culture condition) did not correctly recall their counterpart’s cultural background. These six participants (5.5% of all participants) were dropped from subsequent analyses. Retaining these participants yielded the same pattern of results.

Furthermore, a one-sample t test showed that participants’ ratings on the anger perception measure were significantly above the midpoint of the scale (M = 4.42, SD = 0.85), t(103) = 17.01, p < .001, suggesting that participants clearly perceived the counterpart as angry. There was no effect of the expresser’s culture manipulation on the anger perception measure, F(1, 103) = 0.16, p > .68, indicating that participants in both conditions perceived the counterpart as equally angry.

**Individual gain.** We submitted the anger expresser’s individual gain to a 2 (expresser’s culture: European American vs. East Asian) × 2 (emotional expressivity stereotype: held vs. not held) between-subjects analysis of covariance (controlling for the participants’ first offer, before any anger expression occurred; see Adam et al., 2010; Sinaceur et al., 2013, 2011). Replicating the results from Studies 1, 2, and 3, there was a main effect for expresser’s culture, such that negotiators cooperated more with angry East Asian counterparts than with angry European American counterparts (M = 388.55, SD = 107.47 vs. M = 335.98, SD = 145.36), F(1, 103) = 7.77, p < .01, η² = .07. More importantly for the purposes of the current study, there was also an interaction effect for expresser’s culture and emotional expressivity stereotype, F(1, 103) = 8.52, p < .01, η² = .08. Specifically, negotiators cooperated more with angry East Asian counterparts than with angry European American counterparts when they held the stereotype of East Asians being emotionally inexpressive and European Americans being emotionally expressive (M = 406.92, SD = 89.23 vs. M = 311.15, SD = 143.44), F(1, 50) = 13.72, p = .001, η² = .22. In contrast, negotiators did not cooperate more with angry East Asian counterparts than with angry European American counterparts when they did not hold this stereotype (M = 372.14, SD = 120.73 vs. M = 361.80, SD = 145.69), F(1, 52) = 0.05, p > .83 (see Figure 5).

---

2 We also conducted the analysis using a difference score for which we deducted the emotional expressivity rating of East Asians from the emotional expressivity rating of European Americans. Thus, the higher the difference score, the stronger the stereotype of East Asians being less emotionally expressive than European Americans. Using this difference score yielded the same pattern of results.
different subject populations (managers, university students, and methods (lab experiments, field studies, and scenario studies) and studies used a role-playing methodology, and caution must be gain), and involving participants from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk concession-making, percentage of value claimed, and individual using different measures of cooperation (intention to cooperate, negotiation, negotiation scenario, and face-to-face negotiation),

stereotypes in negotiations, and the interplay of culture and emotions in social interactions.

First, our findings highlight the role of the expresser in understanding the social effects of emotions in negotiations. This research stream has investigated the moderating influence of several factors pertaining to the negotiation, including characteristics of the perceiver (e.g., information-processing motivation; Van Kleef et al., 2004b; the way in which the emotion is expressed (e.g., the target of the emotion; Stein et al., 2008); and contextual factors (e.g., power; Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006). Surprisingly, however, no study thus far has investigated the characteristics of the expresser. In our pursuit of answering the central research question of “Who expresses an emotion (a) to whom (b) in which way (c) in which context (d) and with what effect (e)?” we have an increasingly solid understanding of factors (b) through (e), but we know very little about factor (a).

Our results constitute a first step toward understanding this factor. In a similar vein, recent work outside of negotiations has demonstrated that the effects of expressing anger, happiness, pride, and shame on outcomes such as status conferral and sexual attractiveness depend on the gender of the emotion expresser (Brescoll & Uhlmann, 2008; Tracy & Beall, 2011). Together, these findings indicate that ignoring characteristics of the expresser would prevent us from fully understanding the social effects of emotions and that further research is needed to explore other characteristics of the expresser, such as age, gender, or status. It would also be interesting to see how characteristics of the expresser might interact with other aspects of the negotiation. For example, anger expressions have been shown to be backfire when they are deemed inappropriate or when the perceiver is in a high-power position (Van Kleef & Côté, 2007). It is possible that the adverse effect of expressing anger in these situations could be attenuated or even reversed if the expresser is East Asian rather European American.

Second, the current research contributes to our understanding of the role of stereotypes in negotiations. The vast majority of research on this topic has focused on gender stereotypes (e.g., Kray, Reb, Galinsky, & Thompson, 2004; Kray, Thompson, & Galinsky, 2001). Our findings complement this work by focusing on cultural stereotypes about emotional expressivity. In fact, our pilot study provides the first direct evidence that people hold such stereotypes, and our negotiation studies demonstrate the implications of such stereotypes for negotiation processes and outcomes. Moreover, our findings suggest a potential boundary condition for the backlash effect, which states that counterstereotypical behaviors lead to social and economic reprisals by others (Rudman, 1998). For example, women who behave in an agentic rather than communal way elicit negative reactions that undermine their negotiation performance (e.g., Bowles, Babcock, & Lai, 2007). However, across all four of our studies, East Asians who engaged in coun-

General Discussion

Although past work has shown that anger typically elicits greater cooperation from counterparts in negotiations, the current work indicates that such emotional displays are not equally effective for all negotiators and that reactions to anger may be more variable than initially thought. Across four studies, we found consistent evidence that the expresser’s cultural background significantly shapes the effects of expressing anger in negotiations. Displays of anger elicited significantly greater cooperative efforts when the anger expresser was East Asian compared with when the expresser was European American. This effect was driven by angry East Asian negotiators being perceived as tougher and more threatening compared with angry European American negotiators—although they were perceived as equally angry. Moreover, this effect depended on whether negotiation counterparts held the stereotype of East Asians being emotionally inexpressive and European Americans being emotionally expressive. Overall, our results indicate that negotiators need to take into account not only the cultural background of their counterparts (e.g., Adam et al., 2010; Kopelman & Rosette, 2008) but also their own cultural background when expressing emotions in negotiations.

The impact of the expresser’s cultural background was demonstrated using different types of negotiation (computer-mediated negotiation, negotiation scenario, and face-to-face negotiation), using different measures of cooperation (intention to cooperate, concession-making, percentage of value claimed, and individual gain), and involving participants from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk website as well as university students in the United States, which underscores the robustness of the effect. At the same time, all four studies used a role-playing methodology, and caution must be exercised in generalizing from the results. Our concerns about external validity are assuaged by the fact that research on the social effects of emotions has been highly consistent across both different methods (lab experiments, field studies, and scenario studies) and different subject populations (managers, university students, and the general population) (e.g., Cropanzano et al., 2012; Van Kleef, De Dreu, Pietroni, & Manstead, 2006). Nevertheless, future research should explore the generalizability of our findings to actual organizational negotiation situations.

Importantly, the current research is the first to show that the cultural background of the emotion expresser can have a profound impact on the effectiveness of using emotional displays as a negotiation strategy. This finding makes important contributions and points to fruitful avenues for future research in a number of literatures: the social effects of emotions in negotiations, the role of stereotypes in negotiations, and the interplay of culture and emotions in social interactions.

Figure 5. Expresser’s individual gain as a function of whether or not perceivers hold the stereotype of East Asians being emotionally inexpressive and European Americans being emotionally expressive and expresser’s cultural background (European American vs. East Asian) in Study 4. Error bars represent ± 1 standard error of the mean.
ter stereotypical behavior by expressing anger elicited rewarding rather than penalizing reactions that led to better negotiation outcomes. Our results thus indicate that counterstereotypical behaviors do not always lead to adverse consequences.

Our research also provides some evidence for the intriguing, yet untested idea that the boundary condition for the backlash effect rests on the nature of the stereotype violation. In particular, it has been suggested that the backlash effect only happens for violations of prescriptive stereotypes (which define how people who belong to a stereotyped group should behave, which is the case for gender and agentic behavior), but not for violations of descriptive stereotypes (which define how people who belong to a stereotyped group actually behave, which our results would suggest is the case for culture and emotion expression) (Fiske, 1993; Phelan & Rudman, 2010; Rudman & Fairchild, 2004; Terborg, 1977). Further support for this idea stems from our pilot study in which we measured not only descriptive stereotypes, as reported earlier in the current article, but also prescriptive ones. Specifically, we asked participants to rate the extent to which they think people with an East Asian cultural background and with a European American cultural background should be emotionally expressive in general and should express anger and frustration (α = .75 for East Asians; α = .73 for European Americans). Results indicated that East Asians are not stereotyped to be prescriptively less emotionally expressive than European Americans (M = 3.47, SD = 0.85 vs. M = 3.41, SD = 0.85), t(69) = 0.88, p > .38. In other words, cultural stereotypes about emotional expressivity appear to be descriptive rather than prescriptive.

Finally, the current research constitutes a significant step toward understanding the interplay of culture and emotions in social interactions. Although prior work has elucidated the critical role of the cultural background of the perceiver (Adam et al., 2010; Kopelman & Rosette, 2008), the results of our research point to the importance of the cultural background of the expresser. We thus add a major piece to the puzzle of how culture and emotions interact in negotiations. At the same time, our results underscore the need for further research in this timely, yet understudied area.

For instance, one fruitful avenue for future research would be to explore how this article’s underlying idea—that our cultural background influences how others react to our emotional expressions—extends to other situations. Indeed, the social influence of emotions has been demonstrated in a wide variety of domains ranging from leadership (Van Kleef et al., 2009), to parenting (Klinnert, Campos, Sorce, Emde, & Svejda, 1983), to politics (Glaser & Salovey, 1998). The impact of the expresser’s cultural background across different domains may vary depending on the perceiver’s familiarity with the expresser. On the one hand, people tend to rely less on stereotypes the more they get to know the stereotyped person (Brewer, 1996). This suggests that the influence of the cultural background of the expresser is likely to be stronger when the expresser and the perceiver do not know each other very well (e.g., in one-shot negotiations, customer service settings, etc.) than when they do (e.g., in repeated negotiations, interactions between family members, etc.). On the other hand, individuation processes require mental energy (Neuberg & Fiske, 1987), and trying to suppress stereotypic thoughts can ironically make them even stronger (Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, & Jetten, 1994; Wegner, 1994). This suggests that the influence of the cultural background may prove robust across a range of situations. In today’s globalized society, investigations along these lines would shed much needed light on how contextual, cultural, and emotional factors interact in regulating social life.

References


Appendix

Statements to Communicate Anger in Study 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>After round 1:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After round 3:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After round 5:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>